CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

A theory is necessary in conducting a research. The theory is used to make the research much clearer. Considering that the researcher uses some theories as the basis of the research and also as the way to do the analysis. In this chapter, the researcher explains the theories related to the research. They are theory of politeness, theory of politeness principle, and theory of politeness strategies (FTAs) of Brown and Levinson.

2.1 Spoken and Written Language

Spoken language is not the same as written one. They have different characteristic features. Since this study focuses on the character’s talk that is spoken language, it is important to know between spoken and written language. Gerot and Wignell (1994:158) say that spoken and written language differ in a number of ways. Written language is not simply speech written down. Speaking and writing are manifestations of the same linguistic system but in general they encode meaning in different ways because they have evolved to serve different purposes.

The term “written language” does not only refer to language which is written down. Likewise the term “spoken language” does not only refer to language which is said aloud. For example if someone reads an academic paper aloud, the features of
the language are more like those of written language than spoken language. Similarly, if one transcribes language, the written down version has more in common with spoken language than it does with written. What is at issue here is not just the medium through which language is transmitted but, more importantly, the way meanings are encoded. The key register here is the mode and the key difference between spoken and written language is the relationship between language in the context of speaking (or writing).

Eggins (1994:57) mentions the differences between spoken and written language as shown in table 2.1:

Table 2.1 Characteristic Features of Spoken and Written Language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spoken Language</th>
<th>Written Language</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turn-taking organization</td>
<td>Monologic organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context dependent</td>
<td>Context independent</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Dynamic structure
  - Interactive staging
  - Open-ended | Synoptic structure
  - Rhetorical staging
  - Closed, finite |
| Spontaneous phenomena (false start, hesitations, interruptions, overlap, incomplete clauses) | “Final draft” (polished) indications of earlier drafts removed. |
| Everyday lexis | “Prestige” lexis |
| Non-standard grammatical | Standard grammar |
| Grammatical complexity | Grammatical simplicity |
| Lexically sparse | Lexically dense |

Source: (Eggins, 1994:57)

From the two dimensions of mode above, the basic contrast between spoken and written language can be characterized. The situations where spoken language is used typically interactive situations, i.e. their stretch of talk organized turn by turn.
The speakers keep taking turns by certain mechanism. On the other hand, this kind of turn-by-turn sequencing of talk is not found in any written language.

Spoken language is typically more dependent on its context than written language is. In contrast, written language tends to be more independent of its immediate context. Spoken language is context dependent because one is usually in the same place at the same time when someone talk to each other, the language can depend in part on the context. It will be able to interpret the pronoun or demonstrative from the on-going context shared. On the other hand, a written language needs to stand more or less by itself. It needs to be context independent. Someone cannot start writing an essay by mentioning pronoun or demonstrative because the readers will not be able to interpret it.

Spoken language has dynamic structure because a spoken interaction tends to accompany action, so the structure of the talk will be dynamic. Written language, however, will be organized synoptically because it is intended to encode reflections on a topic.

Spoken language contains spontaneity phenomena such as hesitation, false starts, repetitions, interruptions, etc, while written language usually doesn’t have such features.
Spoken language usually uses everyday language lexis such as slang, and doesn’t follow the standard grammar, but written language usually uses more prestigious vocabularies and uses standard grammar.

Spoken language has a higher level of grammatical intricacy. Grammatical intricacy refers to the number of clauses per sentence, and can be calculated by expressing the number of clauses per sentence, and can be calculated by expressing the number of clauses in a text as a proportion of the number of sentences in a text.

Written language/text generally has a much higher lexical density than spoken language. The lexical density of the text can be calculated by expressing the number of content words in a text/sentence as a proportion of all the words in the texts/sentences.

2.2 Pragmatics

The modern usage of the term pragmatics is attributable to the philosopher Charles Morris (1938:6), who was concerned to outline (after Locke and Peirce) the general shape of a science of signs, or semiotics. Within semiotics, Morris distinguished three distinct branches of inquiry: syntactics (or syntax), being the study of “the formal relation of signs to one another”, semantics, the study of “the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable” (their designate), and pragmatics, the study of “the relation of signs to interpreters” Morris (1938:6).
Within each branch of semiotics, one could make the distinction between pure studies, concerned with the elaboration of the relevant metalanguage, and descriptive studies which applied the metalanguage to the description of specific signs and their usages Morris (1938:24).

As instances of usage governed by pragmatisical rule, Morris noted that “interjections such as Oh!, commands such as Come here!, expressions such as Good morning! And various rhetorical and poetical devices, occur only under certain definite conditions in the users of the language” Morris (1938:48). Such matters would still today be given a treatment within linguistic pragmatics, but Morris went on to expand the scope of pragmatics in accord with his particular behaviouristic theory of semiotics Black (1947:28). “It is a sufficiently accurate characterization of pragmatics to say that it deals with the biotic aspects of semiosis, that is, with all the psychological, biological, and sociological phenomena which occur in the functioning of signs” Morris (1938:54). Such a scope is very much wider than the work that currently goes on under the rubric of linguistic pragmatics, for it would include what is now known as psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, neurolinguistics and much besides.

Since Morris’s introduction of the trichotomy syntax, semantics and pragmatics, the latter term has come to be used in two very distinct ways. On the one hand, the very broad use intended by Morris has been retained, and this explains the usage of the term pragmatics in the titles of books that deal, for example, with matters as diverse as the psychopathology of communication (in the manner of G. Bateson
and R. D. Laing – see Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967:92) and the evolution of symbol systems (see Cherry, 1974:47). Even here though, there has been a tendency to use pragmatics exclusively as division of linguistic semiotics, rather than as pertaining to sign systems in general. This broad usage of the term, covering sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics and more, is still the one generally used on the Continent (see e.g. the collection in Wunderlich, 1972:12, and issues of the Journal of Pragmatics).

On the other hand, and especially within analytical philosophy, the term pragmatics was subject to a successive narrowing of scope. Here the philosopher and logician Carnap was particularly influential. After an initial Morrisian usage (Carnap, 1938:2), he adopted the following version of the trichotomy:

If in an investigation explicit reference is made to the speaker, or to put it in more general terms, to the user of the language, then we assign it [the investigation] to the field of pragmatics… If we abstract from the user of the language and analyze only the expressions and their designate, we are in the field of semantics. And, finally, if we abstract from the designata also and analyze only the relations between expressions, we are in (logical) syntax.

Unfortunately Carnap’s usage of the term pragmatics was confused by his adoption of Morris’s further distinction between pure and descriptive studies, and he came to equate pragmatics with descriptive semiotics in general, and thus with the study of natural (as opposed to logical) languages (Carnap, 1959:13). But Carnap was not even consistent here: he also held (Carnap, 1956:7) that there was room for a pure pragmatics which would be concerned with concepts like belief, utterance, and intension and their logical inter-relation. This latter usage, now more or less defunct,
explains the use of the term in, for example, the title of a book by Martin (1959:84). Thus at least four quite different senses of the term can be found in Carnap’s works, but it was the definition quoted above that was finally influential.

Incidentally, already in Morris’s and Carnap’s usages there can be found a systematic three-way ambiguity: the term pragmatics was applied not only to branches of inquiry (as in the contrast between pragmatics and semantics); but also to features of the object language (or language under investigation), so that one could talk of, say, the pragmatic particle *Oh*! in English, and to features of the metalanguage (or technical description), so that one could talk of, say, a pragmatic, versus a semantic, description of the particle *Oh*!. Such an ambiguity merely seems to parallel the way in which the sister terms semantics and syntax are used and to introduce little confusion.

The idea that pragmatics was the study of aspects of language that required reference to the users of the language then led to a very natural, further restriction of the term in analytical philosophy. For there is one aspect of natural languages that indubitably requires such reference, namely the study of deictic or indexical words like the pronouns *I* and *you*. The philosophical, and especially logical, interest in these terms is simply that they account for the potential failure of generally valid schemes of reasoning. For example, “I am Greta Garbo, Greta Garbo is a woman, therefore I am a woman”, is only necessarily true if in addition to the first two premises being true, the speaker of the conclusion is the same speaker as the speaker of the first premise. Bar-Hillel (1954:359) therefore took the view that pragmatics is
the study of languages, both natural and artificial, that contain indexical or deitic terms, and this usage was explicitly adopted by Kalish (1967:355), and most influentially by Montague (1968:102). Such a usage has little to offer linguists, since all natural languages have deictic terms, and it would follow as Gazdar (1979a:1) points out, that natural languages would have no semantics but only a syntax and a pragmatics. If the trichotomy is to do some work within linguistics, some less restricted scope for pragmatics must be found.

In fact, in the late 1960s, an implicit version of Carnap’s definition investigations requiring reference to the users of a language was adopted within linguistics, and specifically within the movement known as generative semantics. The history of that movement awaits a historian of ideas, but its association with pragmatics can be explained by the resurgence of the interest in meaning which the movement represented. Such an interest inevitably involves pragmatics, as it shall see. Moreover this interest in meaning in a wide sense proved to be one of the best directions from which generative semantics could assail Chomsky’s (1965:42) standard theory. At the same time, there was a keen interest shown by linguists in philosophers’ attempts to grapple with problems of meaning, sometimes from the point of view of the ‘users of the language’. For a period, at least, linguists and philosophers seemed to be on a common path, and this commonality of interest crystallized many of the issues with which this writing is concerned. During this period, the scope of pragmatics was implicitly restricted. Carnap’s ‘investigations making reference to users of the language’ is at once too narrow and too broad for
linguistic interests. It is too broad because it admits studies as non-linguistic as Freud’s investigations of ‘slips of the tongue’ or Jung’s studies of word associations. So studies in linguistic pragmatics need to be restricted to investigations that have at least potential linguistic implications. On the other hand, Carnap’s definition is too narrow in that, on a simple interpretation, it excludes parallel phenomena. For example, just as the interpretation of the words *I* and *you* relies on the identification of particular participants (or ‘users’) and their role in the speech event, so the words *here* and *now* rely for their interpretation on the place and time of the speech event. Therefore Carnap’s definition might be amended to something like: ‘those linguistic investigations that make necessary reference to aspects of the context’, where the term context is understood to cover the identities of participants, the temporal and spatial parameters of the speech event, and the beliefs, knowledge and intentions of the participants in that speech event, and no doubt much besides.

To summarize, a number of distinct usages of the term pragmatics have sprung from Morris’s original division of semiotics: the study of huge range of psychological and sociological phenomena involved in sign systems in general or in language in particular (the Continental sense of the term); or the study of certain abstract concepts that make reference to agents (one of Carnap’s senses); or the study of indexicals or deictic terms (Montague’s sense); or finally the recent usage within Anglo-American linguistics and philosophy. This writing is concerned exclusively with the last sense of the term and it is to an explication of this particular usage that should now be turned.
As the pragmatics study has been added to the review of related literature, politeness will also be added for this is the most theory that the researcher will use in analyzing the data.

2.3 Politeness

What is politeness? Example 1: "Wife lying in bed to husband who is getting dressed". Amy: "What time is it?" Carl: "Almost seven o’clock". Though language serves many functions, there are two – the referential and affective functions – which are particularly pervasive and basic Holmes (1995:5). The interaction in example 1 is primarily referential in its focus. Amy is seeking information which Carl supplies. On other occasions there could be other layers of meaning (e.g. a reproof for waking her so early), but in this case the only purpose of the question was to elicit the time. In other words it is clearly referential in its function.

Example 2: "Young man, Alex, to friend contemplating a flat tyre. What a bastard!". The utterance in example 2, by contrast, is primarily an expression of feeling. It expresses affective rather than referential meaning. No new information is conveyed that is not already apparent to the addressee. What the friend learns is how Alex feels about the situation they are observing. His utterance is clearly affective in its function.

The terminology differs but this fundamental distinction has been repeatedly identified by linguists analyzing many different features of language in a range of contexts (e.g. Brown 1987:61; Edmondson 1981:33; James 1983:191; Schiffrin
The referential function of language is its function in conveying information, facts, or content. The affective function refers to the use of language to convey feelings and reflect social relationships. *Almost seven o’clock* is a predominantly informative utterance in response to *what time is it?*, whereas *What a bastard!* is an utterance with a predominantly affective message. Every utterance must express both functions, though one may be primary.

An utterance is always embedded in a social context which influences its form. The function of a greeting, an apology or a compliment will be predominantly affective or social. But even the form of a radio weather forecast which is predominantly referential in function, conveys information about the assumed social relationship between the presenter and the audience (Bell 1984:148). A great deal of the kind of conversation which is popularly labeled ‘gossip’ illustrates language serving both functions. Gossip conveys information – about people, events, attitudes – as well as serving the cohesive social function of emphasizing membership of the in-group and reinforcing solidarity between contributors. In-group slang conveys a propositions (its referential meaning) as well as a social message in context (emphasizing the boundaries of the group). Even the referentially orientated language of an exam paper reflects a particular (power-based) social relationship. Every utterance conveys social information about the relationship between the participants in the context in which it is uttered. The analysis of linguistic politeness focuses on this affective or social function of language.
Example 3: “Young man knocks on a stranger’s front door and says to the elderly man who opens the door. I’m very sorry to bother you but our car has broken down. Could I possibly use your phone to ring the AA?”. The young man in this example expresses himself very politely. He apologizes for his intrusion, and his request for assistance is couched in very polite terms. Politeness is an expression of concern for the feelings of others. People may express concern for others’ feelings in many ways, both linguistic and non-linguistic. Apologizing for an intrusion, opening a door for another, inviting a new neighbor in for a cup of tea, using courtesy titles like *sir* and *madam*, and avoiding swear words in conversation with your grandmother could all be considered examples of polite behavior.

In everyday usage the term ‘politeness’ describes behavior which is somewhat formal and distancing, where the intention is not to intrude or impose, as illustrated in example 3 above. Being polite means expressing respect towards the person you are talking to and avoiding offending them. I will be using a broader definition of politeness. In this writing ‘politeness’ will be used to refer to behavior which actively expresses positive concern for others, as well as non-imposing distancing behavior. In other words, politeness may take the form of an expression of good-will or camaraderie, as well as the more familiar non-intrusive behavior which is labeled ‘polite’ in everyday usage.

This broader definition derives from the work of Goffman (1967:215) and Brown and Levinson (1987:61), which describe politeness as showing concern for people’s ‘face’. The term ‘face’ is a technical term in this approach. While it is based
on the everyday usages ‘losing face’ and ‘saving face’, it goes further in treating almost every action (including utterances) as a potential threat to someone’s face.

Everybody has face needs or basic wants, and people generally cooperate in maintaining each others’ face, and partially satisfying each other’s face needs. Politeness involves showing concern for two different kinds of face needs: first, negative face needs or the need not to be imposed upon; and secondly, positive face needs, the need to be liked and admired. Behavior which avoids imposing on others (or avoids ‘threatening their face’) is described as evidence of negative politeness, while sociable behavior expressing warmth towards an addressee is positive politeness behavior (Brown and Levinson 1987:102). According to this approach, any utterance which could be interpreted as making a demand or intruding on another person’s autonomy can be regarded as a potential face-threatening act. Even suggestions, advice and requests can be regarded as face-threatening acts, since they potentially impede the other person’s freedom of action. Polite people avoid obvious face-threatening acts, such as insults and orders; they generally attempt to reduce the threat of unavoidable face-threatening acts such as requests or warnings by softening them or expressing them indirectly; and they use positively polite utterances such as greetings and compliments where possible.

Using this definition, behavior such as avoiding telephoning a colleague early on a Sunday morning or apologizing for interrupting a speaker are expressions of negative politeness, while sending a birthday card to a friend, or calling a child sweetie, are expressions of positive politeness. As the examples suggest, politeness
may be expressed both verbally and non-verbally, but in this writing I will be focusing on linguistic politeness or ways in which people express politeness through their use of language. I suggested above that women tend to be more polite than men. More specifically, it will become clear in the following chapters that, in general, women are much more likely than men to express positive politeness or friendliness in the way they use language. Women’s utterances show evidence of concern for the feelings of the people they are talking to more often and more explicitly than men’s do.

Example 4: “Helen and John were talking to their friend Harry who is a school principal. Harry was describing the problems that schools face in adjusting to the new competitive environment and describing the increase in stress this involved for teachers. In the course of the conversation he mentioned in passing some severe physical symptoms of stress that he had been experiencing. At this point Helen’s attention was entirely directed to concern for his physical health, and as soon as there was an opportunity she asked, ‘But are you OK now? Have you seen a doctor?’

John’s almost simultaneous comment continued the philosophical discussion about education policy: ‘But this is a clear example of intensification of work – it’s always the effect of pressure for increased efficiencies’. Harry’s response to Helen’s concern for his health was very brief and even a little impatient, suggesting her question was irrelevant, and this was reinforced as he picked up the discussion with John. When I questioned them later, both men remembered the incident and both
argued that Helen’s concern for Harry’s health was inappropriate and distracting at that point in the discussion, even though they were all close friends.

This example suggests women and men may have different norms in this area. What each sex considers appropriate or polite in any particular context may differ quite markedly.

A variety of explanations has been proposed for gender differences in language use (see, for example, Henley and Kramarae 1991:18; Uchida 1992:547; Noller 1993:223). Some argue that innate biological differences account for sex-differentiated rates of language acquisition, for instance, as well as for differences in psychological orientation or temperament. Psychological differences account for gender differences in orientation to others. Women are more concerned with making connections; they seek involvement and focus on the inter-dependencies between people (e.g. Chodorow 1974:17). Men are more concerned with autonomy and detachment; they seek independence and focus on hierarchical relationships. If one accepts this view, it is possible to see how such psychological differences might account for differences in the ways woman and men use language. A preference for autonomy links more obviously with linguistic strategies that assert control, for example, while a focus on connection relates more obviously to linguistic devices that involve others and emphasize the interpersonal nature of talk.

Other researchers put a great deal of stress on socialization as an explanatory factor (e.g. Maltz and Borker 1982:196; Tannen 1987:167). In many societies, girls and boys experience different patterns of socialization and this, it is suggested, leads
to different ways of using and interpreting language. In modern western societies, most girls and boys operate in single-sex peer groups through an influential period of their childhood, during which they acquire and develop different styles of interaction. The boys’ interaction tends to be more competitive and control-orientated, while the girls interact more cooperatively and focus on relative closeness. Gender differences in patterns of language use can be explained by the fact that girls and boys are socialized into different cultures. Each group learns appropriate ways of interacting from their same sex peers – including ways of interacting verbally.

A third explanation attributes gender-based differences in linguistic behavior to the differential distribution of power in society. Men’s greater social power allows them to define and control situations, and male norms predominate in interaction. (Zimmerman and West 1991:14). It has also been suggested that those who are powerless must be polite. So in communities where women are powerless members of a subordinate group, they are likely to be more linguistically polite than the men who are in control. An emphasis on in-group solidarity is a feature of oppressed groups (Brown and Levinson 1987:72); subordinate groups tend to stress the values and attitudes which distinguish them from those who dominate them. So this is another possible explanation for why women and men differ in the frequency with which they use some feature or linguistic politeness.

How adequate are these explanations? Are they alternatives? Or does each have some contribution to make to an understanding of differences in women’s and
men’s use of language? These are questions which will recur throughout the book as different examples of the way women and men use language are examined.

To choose what politeness strategies that should be used in conversation, the politeness must be considered on the situation whether it is formal or informal.

Politeness is the expression of the speaker’s intention to mitigate face threats carried by certain face threatening acts toward another (Mills, 2003:6). Politeness consists of attempting to save face for another. Politeness theory states that some speech acts threaten others face needs. Politeness theory was created in 1987 by “Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson” and their research has since expanded academia’s perception of Politeness. This text has influenced almost all of the theoretical and analytical work in this field (Mills, 2003: 57).

The most important of Brown and Levinson’s original text on politeness theory is that “We change our language based on hearer and thus our strategies for compliance gaining change depending on the audience. “In everyday life we design message that protect face and achieve other goals as well” (Little John and Foss, 2005:121). According to Brown and Levinson (some Universal in Language Usage, 1987:22). Politeness is the expression of the speaker’s intention to mitigate face threats carried by certain face threatening acts toward another.

Politeness consists of attempting to save face of another. Brown and Levinson (1987:55) begin with the idea of “model person” which means that these rational agents think strategically and are conscious of their language choices. This influenced
Brown and Levinson when examining Goofman’s version of face where they agreed that rational agents have both positive politeness and negative politeness.

After each chart summarizing the four highest level strategies (bald on record, positive politeness, negative politeness, and off record) order strategies and to the final choice of linguistic means to realize highest goals as output strategies.

### 2.4 Politeness Strategies

Brown and Levinson (1987: 101) have four main types of Politeness strategies. They consist of:

#### 2.4.1 Bald on Record

For the purposes, speaker can treat the bald on record strategy as speaking in conformity with Grice’s Maxims (Grice 1975 : 45). These maxims are an intuitive characterization of conversational principles that would constitute guidelines for achieving maximally efficient communication. They may be stated briefly as follows:

- **Maxim of Quality**: Be non spurious (speak the truth, be sincere)
- **Maxim of Quantity**: (a) Don’t say less than is required  
  (b) Don’t say more than is required
- **Maxim of Relevance**: Be relevant
- **Maxim of Manner**: Be perspicuous (avoid ambiguity and obscurity)
The maxim defines for us the basic set of assumptions underlying every talk exchange but this doesn’t imply that litterance in general, or even reasonably frequently, must meet these conditions, as critics of Grice have sometimes thought.

According to Grice’ Maxims (1975 : 45) Politeness is then a major source of deviation from such rational efficiency and is communication precisely by that deviation. The prime reason for bald on record usage may be stated simply in general, whenever S wants to do the FTA with Maximum efficiency more than on the record strategy. There are however different kinds bald on record usage in different circumstances because S can have different motives for his want to do the FTA with maximum efficiency.

2.4.2 Positive Politeness (Brown and Levinson, 1987 : 101)

The positive politeness strategy shows that the hearer has a desire to be respected. It also confirms that the relationship is friendly and expresses group reciprocity.

Strategy 1: Notice, attend to H (his interests, wants, needs, goals)

In general, this output suggest that S should take notice of aspect of H’s condition (noticeable changes, remarkable possessions, anything which looks as though H would S to notice and approve of it).

For example: Gosh, you look cool with your new suit! By the way, can I borrow your hat?

Strategy 2: Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with H)

This is often done with exaggerated intonation, stress and other aspects of prosodic, as well as with intensifying modifies, as in English.

For example: what a fantastic garden you have!

Strategy 3: Intensity interest to H

Another way for S to communicate to H that he shares some of his wants is to intensify the interest of his own (S’s) contributions to the conversation, by “making a good story”.

For example: I come down the stair, and what do you think I see? A huge mess all over the place.

The use of directly quoted speech rather than indirect reported speech is another feature of this strategy, as is the use of tag question or expression that draw as a participant into the conversation, such as “you know?”, “see what I mean?”, “isn’t it?”.
Strategy 4: Use in group identity markers

Other address forms used to convey such as in group membership include generic names and terms of address like Mike, mate, buddy, pal, honey, dear, ducky, luv, babe, mom, blondie, sweetheart, guys, fellas.

For example: Here mate, I was keeping that seat for a friend of mine.

Strategy 5: Seek Agreement

1. Safe topic: the FTA of making a request is normally preceded by an interim of small talk on safe topics as a ways of reassuring H that you didn’t come simply to exploit him / her by making a request, but have an interest in general in maintaining a relationship with him / her.

2. Repetition: Agreement may also be stressed by repeating part or all the Speaker utterance.

For example:

A: John went to London this weekend!

B: To London!

Strategy 6: Avoid disagreement

1. Token agreement: the speakers may go in twisting their utterances so as to appear to agree or to hide disagreement.

For example:

A: Can you hear me?

B: Barely.

2. Pseudo-agreement: “then” and “so”.

For example:
For example: I’ll be seeing you then.

3. White lies: where S, when confronted with the necessity to state opinion, S prefer to do white lie than damage H positive face.
   For example: yes, you look great with that shirt.

4. Hedging opinions: these hedges used to soften FTAs of suggesting or criticizing or complaining, by blushing the speaker’s intent.
   For example: you really should sort of try harder.

**Strategy 7: Presuppose / raise / assert common ground**

1. Gossip, small talk the value of S’s spending time and effort on being with H, as a mark of friendship give rise to the strategy of redressing an FTA by talking for a while about unrelated topic.

2. Personal center switch S to H this is where S speaks as if H were S, or H’s knowledge were equal to S’s knowledge.
   For example: I had a really hard time learning to drive, didn’t I?

3. Time switch the use of the “vivid present” a tense shift from past to present tense.
   For example: John says he really loves your roses

4. Place switch the use of proximal rather than distal demonstratives (here, this, rather than, there, that).
   For example: Here is a man I could trust

5. Presuppose H’s knowledge: the use of any term presupposes that the references are known to the addressee.
For example: Well I was watching Twilight last night and...

**Strategy 8: Joke**

Joking is a basic positive-politeness technique, for putting H “at ease” for example in response to a faux pas H’s, S may joke.

For example: How about lending my this old heap of junk? (heap of junk refer to H’s new BMW)

**Strategy 9: Assert of presuppose S’s knowledge of and concern for H’s wants**

One way indicating that S and H are cooperators and those potentially to put pressure on H to cooperate with S, is to assert of H’s wants and willingness to fit one’s own wants in with them.

For example: I know you love chocolate ice cream, but there is no chocolate ice cream left, so I brought you chocolate cakes instead. (offer & apology)

**Strategy 10: Offer, promise**

Offers and promises are the natural outcome of choosing this strategy. Even if they are false, they demonstrate S’s good intentions in satisfying H’s positive face wants.

For example: I will drop by sometimes next week.

**Strategy 11: Be optimistic**

S wants H to do something by expressing this want in term that S assumes H wants it.

For example: wait you haven’t brushed your hair!
**Strategy 12: Include both S and H in the activity**

By using an inclusive “we” form, when S really means “you” or “me” he can call upon the cooperative assumptions and thereby redress FTAs. Nothing that lets in English is an inclusive “we” form.

For example: Let’s get on with lunch, okay?.

**Strategy 13: Give (or ask for) reason**

Indirect suggestions which demand rather than give reason are conventionalized positive politeness.

For example: Why don’t we go to the beach?

**Strategy 14: Assume or assert reciprocity**

The existence of cooperation between S and H may also be claimed or urged by giving evidence of reciprocal right or obligations obtaining between S and H. Thus S may say, in effect “I’ll do X for you if you do Y for me” or “I did X for you last week, so you do Y for me this week”

**Strategy 15: Give gifts to H (good, sympathy, understanding, cooperation)**

S may satisfy H’s positive face wants (that S want H’s wants, to some degree) by actually satisfying of H’s wants. Hence they have the classic positive politeness action gift-giving, not only tangible gifts, but human-relations wants such as those illustrated in many of the output, understated, listened to, and so-on.
2.4.3 Negative Politeness

Negative politeness is oriented towards a hearer’s negative face, which appeals to the hearer’s not to be impeded or put upon, to be left free to act as they choose.

Brown and Levinson list 10 negative politeness strategies: (1) Be conventionally indirect, (2) Question, hedge, (3) Be pessimistic, (4) Minimize imposition, (5) Give deference, (6) Apologize, (7) Impersonalize, (8) State the imposition as general rule, (9) Nominalize, and (10) Go on record as incurring a debt

**Strategy 1: Be conventionally Indirect**

To convey meanings include the intention of sentence internal “please”.

For example: Can you please pass the salt

**Strategy 2: Question, hedge**

In the literature, a hedge is a particle, word, or phrase that modifies the degree of membership of a predicate or non phrase in a set, it says that membership is partial, or true only in certain respects, or that it is more true and complete than perhaps to be expected.

For example: I am pretty sure I’ve read that book before

**Strategy 3: Be pessimistic**

This strategy gives redress to H’s negative face by explicitly expressing doubt that the conditions for the appropriated of S’s speech act obtain.

For example: could / would / might you do X?
Strategy 4: Minimize the imposition

The choice of strategy encodes the perceived danger of the FTA but it doesn’t of itself indicate which of the social factors, distance, power or relation, is most responsible in determining the value.

For example: Could I have a taste (c.i slice) of that cake?

Strategy 5: Give deference

What is conveyed is that H is of higher social status than S. By conveying directly the perception of a high P differential, deference serves to defuse potential FTA by indicating that the addressee’s right to relative immunity from imposition are recognized.

For example: We look forward very much to dining / eating with you.

Strategy 6: Apologize

1. Admit the impingement: S can simply admit that he is impinging on H’s face.
   
   For example: I’m sure you must be very busy, but...

2. Indicate reluctance: S can attempt to show that he is reluctant to impinge on H with the use of hedges or by means of expression.
   
   For example: I’m terribly embarrassed to have to admit...

3. Give overwhelming reasons: S can claim that he has compelling reasons for doing FTA, thereby implying that normally he wouldn’t dream of infringing H’s negative face.
   
   For example: I simply can’t manage to...
4. Beg forgiveness: S may beg H’s forgiveness, or at least ask for ‘acquittal’ that H could cancel the depth implicit in the FTA.

For example: I’m sorry to bother you...

**Strategy 7: Impersonalize S and H**


   For example: “it is so” (I tell you it is so)

2. Imperative: in the direct expression of one the most intrinsically face threatening speech act commanding most languages omit the ‘you’ of the subject of the complement of the performative.

   For example: “take that out”

3. Replacement of the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’ by indefinites

   For example: “One shouldn’t do things like that”

4. Pluralization of the ‘you’ and ‘I’ pronoun

   For example: “We feel obliged to warm you”

5. Address term as ‘you’ avoidance: note the rudeness of ‘you’ as an address form in a hail or attention-getting phrase.

   For example: “Excuse me, sir / miss / you”

6. References terms as ‘I’ avoidance

   For example: “But the president should not become involved in any part of this case”.

7. Point of view distanting: hence they get negatively polite FTAs with intrinsically remote past tenses.
For example: “I have been wondering whether you could do me a little favor”.

**Strategy 8: State the FTA as a general rule**

One way of dissociating S and H from the particular imposition in the FTA and hence a way of communication that S doesn’t want to impinge but is merely forced to by circumstances, is to state the FTA as an instance of some general social rule, regulation, or obligation.

For example: “Passengers will please refrain from flushing toilet on the train” rather “You will please refrain from flushing toilet on the train”

**Strategy 9: Nominalize**

In English, degrees of negative politeness run hand in hand with degrees of nouniness is that is, formulating is associated with the noun end of the continuum.

For example: “I am surprise that you failed to replay / at you failing / at your failure to replay”.

### 2.4.4 Off Record

A communicative act is done off record if it is done in such a way that it is not possible to attribute only one clear communicative intention to the act. In other words, the actor leaves himself an ‘out’ by providing himself with a number of defensible interpretations of his act.

Such off-record utterances are essentially indirect uses of languages to construct an off record utterance one says something that is either more general or actually different from what one means.
Brown and Levinson (1987:213) list further 15 strategies for performing off-record strategy. These include: (1) Give hints, (2) Give association clues, (3) Presuppose, (4) Understate, (5) Overstate, (6) Use tautologies, (7) Use contradictions, (8) Be ironic, (9) Use metaphors, (10) Use rhetorical question, (11) Be ambiguous, (12) Be vague, (13) Over generalize, (14) Displace hearer, and (15) Be incomplete, use ellipsis which is one of the most frequently encountered off record politeness strategies.

**Strategy 1: Give Hints**

If S says something that is not explicitly relevant, he invites H to search for an interpretation of the possible relevance.

For example: It’s cold in here (c.i. shut the window)

**Strategy 2: Give Association clues**

A related kind of implicature triggered by relevance violations is provided by mentioning something associating with the act required of H, either by precedent in S – S’s experience or by mutual knowledge irrespective of their interactional experience.

For example: “My house isn’t very far away... (intervening material)... There’s the path that leads to my house.” (c.i. please come visit me).

**Strategy 3: Presuppose**

For example: I washed the car again today

From the example above, he presupposes that he has done it before (e.g last week) and therefore may implicate a critism. The use ‘again’ force it to search for the
relevance of the presupposed prior event: if i is relevant only on the assumption hat S and H are counting the times each does the task.

**Strategy 4: Understate**

Understate are only one way of generating implicatures by saying less than is required. Typical ways of constructing understatement re to choose a point on a scalar predicate (e.g. tall, good, nice) that is well below the point that actually describes the state of affairs, or to hedges a higher point which will implicate the (lower) actual state of affairs.

For example:

A: “what do you think of Henry?”

B: “nothing wrong with him.” (c.i. I don’t particuarly like it)

**Strategy 5: Overstate**

If S says more than is necessary (quantity maxims), he may also convey implicatures.

For example: “There were a million people in the co-op tonight.”

**Strategy 6: Use tautologies**

S encourages H to look for an informative interpretation of the non-informative utterance.

For example: War is war

**Strategy 7: Use contradiction**

By stating two things that contradict each other, S makes it appear that he cannot be telling the truth. He thus encourages H to look for an interpretation that reconciles the two contradictory propositions.
For example:

A: Are you upset about that?

B: Well, yes and no

**Strategy 8: Be ironic**

By saying the opposite of what he means, again a violation of quality, S can indirectly convey his intended meaning, if there are clues that his intended meaning is being conveyed indirectly.

For example: “John’s a real jenius.” (after John has just done twenty stupid things in a row)

**Strategy 9: Use metaphors**

Metaphors are further category of quality violations, for metaphors are literally false. The use of metaphor is perhaps usually on record, but there is a possibility that exactly which of the connotations of the metaphor S intends may be off record.

For example: “Henry is real fish”. (c.i. He drinks / swim / is slimy / is cold-blooded like a fish)

**Strategy 10: Use rhetorical questions**

Questions that leave their answers hanging in the air, implicated, maybe used to do FTAs.

For example: How many times do I have to tell you?

**Strategy 11: Be ambiguous**

Purpose ambiguity may be achieved through metaphors, since its not always clear exactly which of the connotations of metaphor are intended to be involved.
For example: John’s a pretty sharp / smooth cookie

**Strategy 12: Be vague**

S may go off record with and FTA by being vague about who the object of the FTA is, or what the offence is.

For example: perhaps someone did something naughty.

**Strategy 13: Over generalize**

Rule instantiation may leave the object of the FTA vaguely off record.

For example: The lawn has got to be mown.

**Strategy 14: Displace H**

S may go off record as to who the target for his FTA is, or he may pretend to address the FTA to someone whom it wouldn’t threaten, and hope that the real target will see that the FTA is aimed at him.

An example: where one secretary in an office asks another but with negative politeness-to pass the staples, in circumstances where a professor is much nearer to the staples than the other secretary. His face is not threatened, and he can choose to do it himself as a bonus “free gift”

**Strategy 15: Be incomplete, use ellipsis**

This is much a violation of the quantity maxim as of the Manner Maxim. Elliptical utterances are legitimated by various conversational contexts. But they are also warranted in FTAs. By leaving an FTA half undone, S can leave the implicature ‘hanging in the air’, just as with rhetorical question.

For example: Well, if one leave one’s tea on the wobbly table...